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Abstract 
 
This work introduces a new method to increase the safety of Boiling Water Reactors 
(BWRs) during the BWR instability and Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA). The 
method is based on a device called Reverse Flow Restriction Device (RFRD) and its 
purpose is to allow the flow in the forward direction, but prevent the flow in reverse 
direction which occurs in multiple accident scenarios. In this thesis, detailed 
TRACE/PARCS simulations have been used to investigate the effect of RFRD on 
the peak clad temperature during BWR instability and LOCA. The device is 
simulated in TRACE by using high friction coefficients for the reverse flow to ensure 
that only forward flow is allowed. The results demonstrate that by adding the RFRD 
device, flow reversal in fuel bundles could be substantially blocked and so the inlet 
flow reversal is thus prevented. The RFRD device also showed a modest impact on 
reducing the power oscillations. The use of RFRD device could prevent fuel dryout 
damage by preventing excessive high clad temperatures due to sustained dryout 
without timely rewetting. For LOCA, the device is capable of containing the coolant 
inside the core during the blowdown and when activating the emergency systems 
which keep the peak clad temperature at lower levels. Moreover, the RFRD achieved 
the reflood phase (when the saturation temperature of the clad is restored) earlier 
than without the RFRD. Sensitivity results demonstrated that for LOCA, high reverse 
flow friction coefficient is needed and hence the RFRD should be well-fitted to the 
lower tie plate to be able to sustain the high pressure caused by the large coolant flow 
during the blowdown phase of LOCA.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
Stability of Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) is a phenomenon that continues to attract 
great interest since BWRs become unstable under certain conditions. Power oscillations 
become dangerous if the automatic reactor scram is lost, like in Anticipated Transient 
without Scram (ATWS) accidents where the reactor scram can be done only by the operator 
action. During the instability period, the clad temperature would increase to dangerous levels 
that might lead to fuel melt. BWRs are also prone to Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) 
when a break occurs in the recirculation loop. The break forces the reactor to scram and start 
depressurization. Moreover, the coolant is lost from the core, leaving the fuel uncovered 
with increased clad temperatures. Thus, it is obvious that instability event and loss of coolant 
accidents in BWRs could damage the fuel if the power oscillations are left without power 
suppression like reactor scram or the reactor is left without cooling during LOCA. 
Consequently, this study aims to analyze the concept of preventing the flow in the reverse 
(downward) direction in the fuel bundle to investigate the capability of mitigating the power 
oscillations without reactor scram during the instability event and containing the coolant 
inside the core during LOCA. Farawila [1] recommended a device to restrict the flow in the 
reverse direction to minimize the oscillations magnitude in BWRs instability events. In this 
thesis, a TRACE/PARCS model for Ringhals-1 power plant has been used to validate the 
potential effect of restricting the flow in the downward direction on mitigation of power and 
flow oscillations. In addition to that, a TRACE/PARCS LOCA model based on Oskarshamn-
2 power plant design has been used to validate the potential effect of reducing the clad 
temperature during LOCA when restricting the flow in the reverse direction by using this 
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kind of device. This study could be valuable if it proves that oscillation magnitude could be 
minimized if the flow in the reverse direction is prevented since it will increase the safety of 
BWRs. If the clad temperature can be reduced during progression of the LOCA accident, 
this will increase the cooling efficiency of the safety systems because the fuel will be kept 
in low temperatures. The following sections provide description about BWR instability, 
LOCA, and system codes.   
1.1 BWR and Flow Instabilities  
The main reasons behind the instability in BWRs could be due to the two-phase flow, 
neutronics feedback, thermal-hydraulics feedback, and plant control system. Among all of 
these, when both neutronics and thermal-hydraulics feedbacks are added, coupled 
neutronics-thermal-hydraulics instabilities can occur and these instabilities are considered 
the dominant type of instabilities in BWRs, especially when the core is subjected to high 
power-low flow conditions [2]. The change in the void fraction as voids travel upward inside 
fuel bundles causes perturbations in the reactivity which affect the neutronics feedback in 
addition to the thermal-hydraulics feedback. Three main modes of instability might happen 
due to coupled neutronics-thermal-hydraulics feedback [2]:  
 Single channel instability: occurs in a single fuel bundle in the core due to density-
wave oscillations, pressure drop oscillations, or power disturbance in a single 
channel.  
 Core-wide oscillation (In-phase or global mode): it can be described as a single 
channel where both the power and the inlet flow rate have in-phase oscillations, and 
these oscillations occur coherently in all fuel bundles.  
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 Regional oscillations (Out-of-phase or local mode): the core behaves like two 
parallel channels where the core is divided into two regions and each region oscillates 
out-of-phase with respect to the other region. The flow of the first region channels 
oscillates out-of-phase with respect to the channels of the second region, and vice 
versa. 
To prevent the oscillations in BWR or at least mitigate their effect, the parameters that 
affect the stability of BWR should be measured. Many parameters that can destabilize the 
reactor like distribution of pressure drop inside the core, axial power distribution, reactivity 
coefficients and subcooling at the core inlet [3]. Many instability events have been reported 
over the years, for example, Oskarshamn-2 power plant suffered from flow instabilities in 
1999 due to a load rejection signal resulted in a turbine trip and loss of feedwater preheaters 
which left the core unstable due to the high power-low flow conditions. Kozlowski et al. [4] 
provided detailed description of this event in their paper. The high power conditions were 
detected by the Average Power Range Monitors (APRM) and the reactor was automatically 
scrammed without any fuel damage. The power oscillations during this accident have been 
recorded and the plot of the oscillations is shown in Figure 1.1 where the oscillations have 
been terminated by reactor scram at 252s. 
The issue of BWRs attracted researchers in the previous years to understand, model and 
simulate this phenomenon. Kozlowski et al. [4] used TRACE/PACRS code to model the 
Oskarshamn-2 event and validate with the measured data from the plant. Their study 
demonstrated good agreement with the measured data including oscillation growth, 
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beginning of instability, and oscillation frequency. Validation of measured power 
oscillations with TRACE/PARCS (which will be used in this work) is shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.1. Power oscillations in Oskarshamn-2 instability event [4] 
 
Figure 1.2. Validation of measured power oscillations with TRACE/PARCS solution [4] 
Since BWR instability is dominated by Density Wave Oscillations (DWO), this topic 
has to be described in this context. DWO are undesirable in boiling channel systems because 
sustained oscillations could cause mechanical vibration and system control problems. 
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Consider the heated channel that is shown in Figure 1.3 which shows a channel with constant 
pressure drop (boundary condition) where the coolant enters as subcooled water at the core 
inlet, and then flows upward through the channel [5]. The heat is applied to the channel to 
boil the flowing liquid. Water density varies as water moves up because of the two-phase 
flow. If a positive perturbation occurs in the inlet velocity (flow rate), a high density wave 
will develop and travel to the channel exit, making the pressure drop at exit (ΔP2) to increase. 
However, in order to keep the pressure drop constant across the channel (boundary 
condition), pressure drop at the inlet (ΔP1) decreases with same amount but with opposite 
sign. Now, the process is reversed as this decrease in ΔP1 will cause the inlet velocity to drop 
and a low density wave will develop and travel to the channel exit. This will make ΔP2 to 
decrease resulting in an increase in the inlet velocity and the cycle is starting over again 
leaving the channel in unstable flow behavior[2] [6].   
 
Figure 1.3. Schematic of the flow in a single channel in BWRs [5] 
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1.2 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) 
 
BWR is characterized by two-phase flow, where the steam-water mixture that exits from 
the core goes to steam separators and dryers which are located on the top of the core to 
separate steam and water (See Figure 1.4). The steam goes to turbine while the separated 
water flows downward to mix with the feedwater that comes from the turbine and the both 
of them return to the core. Figure 1.4 shows a sketch of BWR-6 and the flow path inside that 
reactor. Now, if a break occurs in the suction side of the recirculation pump, a Loss of 
Coolant Accident (LOCA) begins and it is one of the most challenging accidents for nuclear 
reactors because the coolant is lost from the core due to the break, resulting in increased fuel 
temperature which could lead to fuel damage and core melt. Once the break occurs, the 
reactor scrams and the core starts depressurization. Reverse flow in the broken loop occurs, 
and this flow will be lost through the break as well. In general, there are three phases for 
LOCA accident, the three phases are described in Table 1.1 [7], [8]. 
 
Figure 1.4: Structure and recirculation flow path in general electric BWR-6 [8] 
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Table 1.1: Major events during LOCA phases [7], [8] 
Phase Events 
Blowdown 
(0-30) 
1- Reactor pressure and coolant inventory decreased rapidly, resulting in 
increase in fuel cladding temperature.  
2- Core becomes fully uncovered.  
3- During the early phase of the depressurization, the exiting coolant provides 
core cooling.  
4- The High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) injecting water but with small flow 
rate due to the high pressure to provide some heat removal.  
5- The end of blowdown is defined to occur when the core spray and Low 
Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) reach rated flow. 
Refill 
(30-40s) 
1- LPCI part of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and core sprays on 
the core top are functioning, to provide a high flow rate of coolant.  
2- During this phase, the core sprays and LPCI provide core cooling and supply 
liquid to refill the lower plenum of the reactor vessel. 
Reflood  
(40-250s) 
1- This phase begins when the lower plenum is refilled and the fuel assemblies 
are start to cool from bottom to top.  
2- The clad retains its saturation temperature as the cladding quenches. 
3- The LPCI and core sprays continue to reflood the core until all heat is 
removed. 
 
LOCA is characterized by loss of coolant and core heat-up, as the temperature of the fuel 
increases, different physical phenomena come to the picture as listed in Table 1.2. Each 
phenomenon results in a release of different types of actinides and fission products 
depending on the temperature reached during the accident. According to the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC), the clad temperature should not exceed the 
limit of 2200 ºF (~1480 K) during LOCA in order to reuse the fuel again in operation. 
Table 1.2: Physical phenomena that would occur during LOCA [7] 
Temperature (ºC) Physical Phenomena 
350 Approximate cladding temperature during normal operation  
800-1450 Clad swelling due to internal gas pressure, some fission gases 
release, solid reaction between Zircaloy and stainless steel, clad 
swelling would block flow path. 
1450-1500 Cladding-steam reaction produce excess energy, cladding become 
brittle, H2 formed, steel alloy melts 
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Table 1.2 (cont.) 
1550-1650 Zircaloy-steam reaction would become autocatalytic (i.e. feeding 
upon itself) unless Zircaloy is quenched by immersion. 
1900 Zircaloy cladding melts 
2150 Significant release of fission product from UO2 
2700 UO2 and ZrO2 both melt 
 
As LOCA is one of the challenging accident in nuclear industry, significant research has 
been conducted in this area to investigate the core behavior during LOCA as well as the 
consequences of such accidents. Computational codes have been developed to analyze 
LOCA such as TRACE [9]. TRACE has been used to investigate the Counter-Current Flow 
Limitation (CCFL) which is a two-phase flow phenomenon occurs during LOCA where two 
phases (e.g. liquid water and steam) flow in opposite directions. The steam generated in the 
core flows upward preventing liquid coolant from reaching the fuel in the core. In general, 
CCFL affects the ability to re-introduce liquid coolant into a reactor in an LOCA accident 
[10], [11]. Experiments have been conducted in small scaled facilities to investigate the 
effect Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) as well as Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) on various 
parameters inside the core, and these experiments have been used to validate TRACE [12].  
1.3 System Codes 
 
  In general, system codes are classified into two main categories: Frequency Domain 
Codes and Time Domain Codes. Frequency domain codes are designed to be simple to get 
faster computational time with acceptable accuracy by employing reduced order model like 
1D thermal-hydraulics model or point reactor kinetics to simplify the phenomena [13]. The 
main concept behind these codes is linearization of the governing equations and using the 
Laplace transformation in frequency domain. Frequency domain codes are preferred when 
analyzing the linear stability behavior of BWRs and for steady-state problems [14]. 
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However, time domain codes evolved to overcome the shortcomings of frequency domain 
codes and now are widely used to analyze the non-linear stability behavior of BWRs and for 
transient problems. These codes started evolving during the 80s when the computer 
computational power was improving such that the simplifications done by frequency domain 
codes can be avoided to obtain accurate nuclear power plant models. Consequently, time 
domain codes provide a sophisticated modeling like 3D spatial reactor kinetics, 3D parallel 
channel modeling, and reactor components modeling [14]. A comparison between the main 
characteristics of frequency and time domain codes are given in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: Characteristics of frequency and time domain codes  
Item Frequency Domain Code Time Domain Code 
Governing solution method Reduced Order Model Numerical scheme 
Computational Time Fast Slow 
Linear Capabilities Only linear  Linear and non-linear  
Usage For linear stability and steady 
state problems 
For non-linear stability and 
transient problems 
Examples LAPUR-5, ODYSY, HIBLE RELAP5, RAMONA, TRACE  
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters including this introductory chapter. The remaining 
Chapters of this work are organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the codes 
that have been used in the thesis. Chapter 3 provides a description of the flow restriction 
device proposed for this study. TRACE/PARCS models for Ringhals-1 and Oskarshamn-2 
and the modeling details used in this work are described in details in Chapter 4. The results 
obtained from this study along with discussion of the results are presented in Chapter 5. 
Finally, the conclusions from this work and any possible future work that can be built on this 
study are given in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2. CODES AND TOOLS DESCRIPTION    
 
2.1 TRACE (TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine) 
 
TRACE is the latest best-estimate reactor systems code developed by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (U.S.NRC) for analyzing steady state and transient thermal-
hydraulics systems for light water reactors. U.S.NRC combined its main four codes (TRAC-
P, TRAC-B, RELAP5, and RAMONA) into one modernized and advanced computational 
code. Originally, TRACE has been designed to perform best-estimate analyses of LOCAs, 
but it can simulate other phenomena in Light Water Reactors (LWRs) like operational 
transients, ATWS, two-phase flow, heat transfer problems, and others. Strictly speaking, 
TRACE can be seen as a two-phase, two-fluid solver where the two-fluid six conservation 
equations (i.e. 2 continuity, 2 momentum, and 2 energy equations) are solved for liquid and 
vapor phases of water. If the user wants tracking of non-condensable gases and dissolved 
solute in liquids, two additional equations are solved. To solve these conservation equations, 
additional constitutive relations and jump conditions are required. The six field conservation 
equations coupled with interface jump conditions can be expressed as the following [9]:  
Continuity Equations  
𝜕[(1−𝛼)?̅?𝑙]
𝜕𝑡
+ ∇. [(1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑙 ?⃗⃗?𝑙]
̅̅̅̅ = −𝛤                    (2.1) 
𝜕[𝛼?̅?𝑔]
𝜕𝑡
+ ∇. [𝛼?̅?𝑔 ?⃗⃗?𝑔
̅ ] = 𝛤                      (2.2) 
Momentum Equations  
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𝜕[(1−𝛼)?̅?𝑙?⃗⃗?𝑙]
𝜕𝑡
+ ∇. (1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑙 ?⃗⃗?𝑙?⃗⃗?𝑙
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∇. [(1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑙] + (1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑙?⃗? − 𝑀𝑖̅̅ ̅           (2.3) 
𝜕[𝛼?̅?𝑔?⃗⃗?𝑔]
𝜕𝑡
+ ∇. 𝛼?̅?𝑔 ?⃗⃗?𝑔?⃗⃗?𝑔
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∇. [𝛼?̅?𝑔] + 𝛼?̅?𝑔?⃗? + 𝑀𝑖̅̅ ̅                (2.4) 
Energy Equations 
𝜕[(1−𝛼)?̅?𝑙(𝑒𝑙+
𝑉𝑙
2
2
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
]
𝜕𝑡
+ ∇. [(1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑙 (𝑒𝑙 +
𝑉𝑙
2
2
)?⃗⃗?𝑙]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
= −∇. [(1 − 𝛼)𝑞𝑙
′̅⃗⃗⃗⃗ ] + ∇. [(1 − 𝛼)𝛱𝑙. ?⃗⃗?𝑙
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] +
(1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑙𝑔.⃗⃗⃗⃗ ?⃗⃗?𝑙
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐸?̅? + 𝑞𝑑𝑙̅̅ ̅̅                       (2.5) 
𝜕[𝛼?̅?𝑔(𝑒𝑔+
𝑉𝑔
2
2
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
]
𝜕𝑡
+ ∇. [𝛼?̅?𝑔 (𝑒𝑔 +
𝑉𝑔
2
2
)?⃗⃗?𝑔]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
= −∇. [𝛼𝑞𝑔′̅̅ ̅
⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗] + ∇. [𝛼(𝛱𝑔. 𝑉⃗⃗⃗⃗ ?⃗?)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] + 𝛼?̅?𝑔𝑔.⃗⃗⃗⃗ ?⃗⃗?𝑔
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐸?̅? + 𝑞𝑑𝑔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
(2.6)  
where the over bar represents a time average, and the subscripts of “g” and “l” represent 
gas and liquid term, respectively. ?⃗⃗? is the velocity vector, 𝜌 is the physical density, α is the 
gas volume fraction, e is the internal energy, ?⃗? is the gravity vector, and Г, Ei, and Mi 
represent the contribution of time averaged jump conditions to transfer of mass, energy and 
momentum, respectively. In addition, q’ is conductive heat flux, qd is the heat flux by direct 
heating and 𝛱 is the full stress tensor. The other variables that include two or more quantities 
with a bar on the top (e.g. ?⃗⃗?𝑙?⃗⃗?𝑙
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, (𝑒𝑔 +
𝑉𝑔
2
2
)?⃗⃗?𝑔
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)  can be resolved into their constituent variables 
using numerical methods. 
At this point it is possible to mention that TRACE is a 1D code which means that the 
above conservation equations (Eq. 2.1 – Eq. 2.6) need to be averaged on area to get the 1D 
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conservation equations. TRACE tackles the differential equations of the flow and heat 
transfer as follows: 
 Finite volume scheme is used to solve the partial differential equations of two-phase 
flow and heat transfer. 
 Semi-implicit time difference scheme is used to solve heat transfer equations. 
 Multi-step time-differencing procedure is used to solve the fluid dynamics equations 
in the 1-D and 3-D. 
 Newton-Raphson iteration method is used to tackle the coupled, nonlinear equations 
of the hydrodynamic phenomena. 
 Direct matrix inversion is used to solve the linearized form of equations for the 
hydrodynamic phenomena. 
TRACE is a time domain code which means that the code usually takes a long time to 
run (See Table 1.3) depending on the complexity of the problem. Other factors like number 
of mesh cells and the timestep size also play a major role in affecting the execution time. A 
powerful technique called SETS (Stability-Enhancing Two-Step) is used by TRACE to 
adjust the time step size, so that a large time step could be used in slow transients in which 
the phenomena becomes easy to evaluate. This leads to a significant reduction in the 
computational cost for slow-developing accident. Automatic restart capabilities are available 
in TRACE along with coupling with reactor kinetics code PARCS (See Section 2.3).    
In summary, TRACE has been selected here because it has many features that fulfill 
the requirements of this study including: 
 TRACE is already designed for LOCA modeling, and it can also simulate the 
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instability phenomena in BWRs with good accuracy since it can be coupled with 
reactor physics code PARCS.  
 Effect of oscillations on power, flow rate, and clad temperature can be studied 
through TRACE. 
 TRACE is capable both the forward and reverse flow with the option of 
controlling the friction coefficient for both directions.   
 TRACE is accurate in predicting clad temperature excursion in case of exceeding 
critical heat flux conditions which means that the effect of using the device can 
be demonstrated. 
2.2 PARCS (Purdue Advanced Reactor Core Simulator) 
 
PARCS is a 3D reactor core simulator used to solve both multi-group neutron diffusion 
and SP3 transport equations. PARCS is capable to solve steady-state and transient problems 
for orthogonal and non-orthogonal geometries. PARCS needs cross-section data to solve the 
differential equations which can be imported from lattice physics codes like TRITON or 
CASMO. A separate module called GenPMAXS is used to process the cross-sections 
generated by lattice physics codes and convert it into PMAXS format that can be read by 
PARCS. PARCS has many reactor analysis features including (1) eigenvalue calculations 
which can be used as initial state for transient calculations, (2) reactor kinetics, (3) Xenon 
transient, (4) decay heat, (5) pin power, and (6) depletion calculations. PARCS code 
capabilities include not only LWRs but also Heavy Water Reactors and High Temperature 
Gas Reactors. PARCS can be run in standalone mode (without coupling) or coupled with 
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thermal-hydraulic codes like TRACE or RELAP5 to provide the flow field and temperature 
for neutronics feedback. Further details about PARCS can be found in the code manual [15]. 
2.3 TRACE/PARCS  
 
TRACE deals with the neutronics on a core-wide basis by solving the point reactor 
kinetics. This makes TRACE limited when dealing with transients where large power 
excursions could happen like in BWR instability or control rod ejection accidents. This 
limitation can be overcome by coupling TRACE with PARCS where the spatially local 
neutronic response can be modeled. For coupling, the user has to prepare two input files, one 
for TRACE and one for PARCS, with a coupling file to couple neutronic nodes to thermal 
hydraulic channels. Coupled TRACE/PARCS can be executed through the TRACE 
executable file (See Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. Stages of execution of coupled TRACE/PARCS 
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A common approach is used when running a coupled TRACE/PARCS and it includes 
three stages, (1) TRACE stand-alone steady-state, (2) TRACE/PARCS coupled steady-state, 
and (3) TRACE/PARCS coupled transient. Figure 2.1 summarizes the stages for coupling 
between TRACE and PARCS codes. The three stages are connected by restart files for both 
TRACE and PARCS. After steady-state calculations, two restart files along with two input 
files for TRACE and PARCS could be used to initiate coupled TRACE/PARCS transient 
calculations. 
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CHAPTER 3. REVERSE FLOW RESTRICTION DEVICE 
(RFRD)   
 
The current suppression of instability event in BWR depends on the ability of the 
operator or automatic protection systems like reactor scram to interfere and terminate the 
event. However, in the case of Anticipated Transient without Scram with Instability 
(ATWSI) where the ability of automatic scram is lost by definition, the only way to terminate 
the event depends on operator recognition of the accident and correct response to reduce 
feedwater flow to lower the water level in the reactor vessel, and ultimately boron injection. 
Therefore, this solution is highly dependent on operator response and hence subjected to 
human error. For LBLOCA, when the break happens, the core starts depressurization, and 
once the core pressure drops below a certain level (about 0.2 MPa), the core spray and ECCS 
begin working. The activation of the ECCS pumps to start reflooding the core takes time. In 
case of delay of activation of the pumps, the core is left without cooling and the fuel bundles 
become hotter. It is clear that the above problems would benefit from practical solutions to 
keep the reactor safe during these types of accidents. In this thesis, a hardware device is 
proposed to overcome the problems that would occur during LOCA and ATWSI, and an 
introduction to this device is presented in this Chapter. 
3.1 Device Configuration 
 
The device should preserve the stability characteristics of the host fuel where the 
inception of instability or LOCA accidents are not prevented by this RFRD device. The 
device may mitigate the adverse effects during these two accidents by limiting the growth 
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of the oscillations during the instability accident and keeping more coolant in the core during 
LOCA. The device is called Reverse Flow Restriction Device (RFRD) [16], and it is 
introduced to the lower tie plate of the fuel assembly to act as a check valve. When the flow 
is going in the (forward) direction, the valve opens and the flow is allowed. Figure 3.1 shows 
an example of flow in a pipe where the forward flow is unobstructed. However, when the 
flow goes in the reverse direction, the valve will close resulting in blocking, or substantially 
reducing the flow in the reverse direction. Figure 3.1 also demonstrates that when the flow 
goes reversal, the screen closed to substantially reduce the flow.  In both cases, the device 
should not affect the hydraulic characteristics of the core to assure proper utilization of the 
device. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 (a)                                                                        (b) 
Figure 3.1. Flow in a pipe controlled by a check valve where (a) forward flow is allowed 
and (b) reverse flow is prevented [17]. 
 
RFRD concept is similar to that shown in Figure 3.1 where the limiting reverse flow 
magnitude can be achieved by equipping the fuel bundle inlet with RFRD. Farawila [1], [16] 
in his paper was first to recommend this device. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the lower tie plate 
of a fuel assembly for BWR without the device on the left and it shows one- half of the lower 
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tie plate but with the proposed device equipped on the right. RFRD consists of a grid of 
check valves for each fuel channel inside the fuel assembly. The sketch shows that RFRD 
consists of two parallel plates where each plate has holes forming a cavity inside, and the 
screen is free to move between the plates. 
  
 
(a)                                                                        (b) 
Figure 3.2. Lower tie plate of the fuel bundle: (a) without RFRD and (b) with RFRD 
inserted to prevent the reverse flow [1] 
 
Figure 3.3 shows isometric and top view of the screen that moves between the plates 
during the flow direction changes. The screen has a grid structure and it consists of array of 
disks aligned with the holes in the plates. The holes in the grid have tabs to keep the forward 
flow unobstructed, while during the reverse flow the screen goes down blocking the holes 
beneath it. The disks should be well-fitted to the screen to assure high friction factor in the 
reverse direction to block the flow and to avoid releasing of loose parts during large 
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blowdown of water (e.g. LBLOCA). The device shown in Figure 3.3 is designed for 9x9 
type of BWR fuel bundles.  
  
(a)                                                                        (b) 
 
Figure 3.3. (a) Top view of the RFRD (b) Isometric sketch of the RFRD 
 
During the forward flow the coolant flow exerts a force to lift the screen into the upper 
plate. In the reverse flow, the pressure exerted by the coolant disappears and hence the screen 
drops to the down position and rests against the lower plate (See Figure 3.4). The floating 
screen switches between the up (open) and down (closed) position based on the flow 
direction and this distance is very small to eliminate high speed movement which means the 
opening and closure of the flow path are not abrupt but rather smooth. Figure 3.4 shows a 
vertical cut drawing of the lower tie plate structure including the floating screen between 
two parallel plates. The screen on the left figure is in the up position which is the normal 
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position with the flow in the upward direction, while the figure on the right shows the screen 
in the down position to prevent the reverse flow which happens during accidents conditions.  
 
(a)                                                                      (b) 
Figure 3.4. Position of the RFRD against the upward and downward (reverse) flow 
 
There are some constraints that should be considered when designing this device to 
assure proper utilization of the device during reactor operation [1]: 
1-  The probability of failure of this device in the blocked position should be negligible. 
2- The floating screen should be rigid and well-designed to avoid release of loose parts 
which might cause further problems like blocking the forward flow in the fuel 
bundles, or damaging the cladding.  
3- Flow tests under various flow conditions should be carried out to ensure that the 
flow-induced vibrations caused by the device are negligible.  
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4- The introduction of the RFRD should not adversely affect the flow in the bundles 
without RFRD (i.e. if the device is used only in specific bundles) or any other aspects 
of the plant operation.   
3.2 RFRD for Instability Events 
 
During the BWR instability accident, the reactor enters the unstable state and the inlet 
mass flow rate of the coolant in each fuel bundle will start to oscillate about its average 
value. If the inlet mass flow oscillation amplitude is large enough, then flow reversal occurs 
in this fuel bundle. At the beginning of the oscillations, the waves take a sinusoidal shape 
and the flow oscillates as a function of time in the positive region where the peaks and valleys 
are both positive (see Figure 3.5 in the period 110-120 s). As time approaches, the oscillation 
magnitude grows and the peak value increases. In this case, the screen remains in the up 
position as long as the minimum flow value remains positive (i.e. flow remains in the upward 
direction) and exerts small pressure to lift the screen into the upper plate and maintain the 
flow through the open holes. When the oscillation magnitude of the inlet flow increases such 
that the flow is insufficient to maintain the screen in the up position, i.e. flow reverses in 
direction (see Figure 3.5), the screen shifts to the lower plate and the disk blocks the holes 
beneath them. After that, the flow oscillation will again grow to positive value where the 
hydraulic forces and the forward flow lift the screen to the up position and the holes will 
open leaving the upward flow unobstructed. The flow cycle above keeps repeating and the 
screen switches between up and down positions depending on the flow direction. In 
summary, the main goal of the device in this type of accidents is allowing forward flow and 
preventing reverse flow during the oscillatory cycle. 
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Figure 3.5. Flow rate oscillations in a fuel bundle in BWR instability accident 
 
3.3 RFRD for LOCA 
 
During LBLOCA (e.g. large break in the recirculation loop), a massive amount of 
coolant leaves the core through the break in a short time. This makes the fuel to uncover 
quickly and become hotter due to the considerable loss of cooling (i.e. after occurrence of 
the critical heat flux). Once the break happens, the coolant direction reverses, and the upward 
flow becomes downward allowing the coolant to flow out from the inlet of the fuel assembly 
to the lower plenum, then leaving the vessel out to the containment. 
After the break during LOCA, the core pressure decreases continuously, and the low 
pressure cooling systems take a long time to activate because it can operate only at relatively 
small pressure (about 0.2 MPa), while the BWR core pressure is approximately 7.0 MPa. 
Reverse flow 
Forward flow 
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During the time of depressurization, the fuel is subjected to overheat and possibly melt down 
until the core sprays and LPCI are activated to provide adequate heat transfer to remove the 
heat deposited in the core region. If RFRD is used at the fuel bundle inlet, the depletion of 
coolant from the core bottom both during blowdown and when ECCS is activated may be 
prevented, which leads to reduction of clad temperature rise and significant improvements 
in LOCA performance. Some plants that are constrained by LOCA, the regulatory bodies 
force these plants to operate at reduced power level to minimize the effects of LOCA. If this 
device proves to be effective during LOCA, regulatory constraints can be avoided which 
would result in higher power operation, better fuel utilization, and improvement in 
economics and safety of the plant [18].  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND MODELING  
 
TRACE is a component-based code where the user can represent the physical system by 
a combination of pre-defined components. Each component can be nodalized by the user by 
specifying how many nodes are in that component. A brief list of the TRACE components 
that are relevant to this study is listed in Table 4.1. The VESSEL component is used to 
represent the pressure vessel, and CHAN component is used to model the fuel assemblies 
inside the core region. 1-D PIPE component is used to represent the piping system in the 
reactor. VALVE is used to control the flow in the system through a user-defined hydraulic 
diameter and flow area. FILL and BREAK components are used to impose boundary 
conditions for mass flow rate and pressure, respectively. SEPD component is used to 
represent the steam separators and dryers in BWRs. 
Table 4.1: Brief list of TRACE components that are used in this study 
TRACE notation SNAP 
representation 
TRACE notation SNAP 
representation 
VESSEL 
(Core vessel) 
 
PUMP  
(Pump) 
 
PIPE  
(Pipe) 
 
VALVE  
(Valve) 
 
BREAK  
(Pressure boundary 
condition) 
 
FILL 
(Flow boundary 
condition) 
 
SEPD 
(Steam Separator) 
 
CHAN  
(BWR fuel assembly) 
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4.1 RFRD Implementation 
 
In TRACE, two different approaches can be used to implement the RFRD device which 
was described in Chapter 3. First is applying a check valve at the bundle inlet of the fuel 
bundle.  The issues for this approach are: (1) the device will keep changing its position from 
up to down through instability accident and (2) the RFRD device will be introduced to all 
fuel bundles (~ 400 – 700 assemblies) and both of these issues will increase the complexity 
of the model and make it computationally expensive for TRACE. Therefore, this approach 
will not be used here. The second method to apply RFRD can be done by taking advantage 
of the capability of TRACE to simulate both the forward and reverse flow. If a large friction 
coefficient is used at the bundle inlet for the reverse flow, and leaving the forward flow 
friction coefficient as it is (with considering the increase in friction in the forward direction 
due to the device), the RFRD effect may be simulated in TRACE.  In this case, the forward 
flow is allowed and once the flow reverses in direction, the high friction coefficient will 
prevent the reverse flow. In TRACE, two different friction coefficients in the form of 
additive loss coefficients or k-factor can be used as follows (see Figure 4.1): 
1- FRIC or KFAC: friction coefficient or k-factor in the forward direction.  
2- FRICR or KFACR: friction coefficient or k-factor in the reverse direction. 
The fuel channel is divided into 28 axial nodes (See Figure 4.1). The RFRD device is 
applied by increasing the value of KFACR at the first inlet node and this is sufficient to 
ensure blocking the reverse flow. The activation of the reverse flow friction coefficient in 
TRACE can be done by editing the appropriate NAMELIST variables in TRACE.  
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Figure 4.1. Fuel channel nodalisation in TRACE and location of inlet friction factor 
coefficient 
 
4.2 Ringhals-1 TRACE Model for Instability 
 
Ringhals-1, a Swedish BWR reactor, has been selected to simulate the BWR instability 
accident since the reactor is large and it has large number of fuel bundles, and the flow rate 
reversal could be observed during instability events. General plant data and operating 
conditions are listed in Table 4.2. The TRACE/PARCS model is based on OECD/NEA 
Ringhals-1 Stability Benchmark [19], [20]. However, the model in the benchmark is 
modified in this thesis to induce in-phase instability, and increase the oscillation amplitude 
to investigate the effect of preventing flow in the reverse direction on the core stability. 
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Specific channels have been selected where the flow rate oscillates from positive to negative 
values (i.e. flow rate reversal) to clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of the device.  
Table 4.2: Ringhals-1 vessel geometry and operating conditions 
Item Value 
Rated thermal power (MWth) 1700 
Dome pressure (MPa) 7.0 
Steam flow rate (kg/s) 855 
Rated recirculation flow (kg/s) 7800 
Vessel height (m) 20 
Wall thickness (mm) 134 
Equivalent core diameter (mm) 2975 
Equivalent core height (mm) 4398 
Number of fuel bundles 648 
 
The nodalization scheme of Ringhals-1 TRACE model is shown in Figure 4.2. The 
reactor model consists of the following parts: 
1- Reactor vessel represented by VESSEL component.  
2- 648 fuel bundles represented by 325 BWR CHAN components with one-half core 
symmetry. 
3- One recirculation loop consists of two pipes and one recirculation pump. Each loop 
has an outtake pipe connected to the downcomer, through which the coolant is 
redirected to a recirculation pump.  
4- Turbine system consists of a PIPE, a VALVE, and a BREAK to impose a pressure 
boundary condition. 
5- Feedwater system consists of a PIPE component and a FILL to impose a flow rate 
boundary condition.  
6- One steam separator represented by SEPD component. 
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Figure 4.2. Ringhals-1 TRACE model nodalization to simulate BWR instability accident. 
The reactor vessel is modeled by 3D VESSEL component with 11 axial cells, 2 radial 
cells, and 1 azimuthal sector. Each CHAN component is modeled with 28 uniform axial 
nodes. Both forward and reverse flow friction coefficients have been added to each channel 
component to model RFRD device. PARCS is supplemented with cross-section, geometry 
and coupling files. TRACE/PARCS Ringhals-1 model was benchmark against the measured 
data [20].  
TRACE is coupled with a 3D PARCS, a neutronics code. PARCS is capable of 
calculating the kinetic behavior of the core and other neutronics calculations to predict the 
response of the reactor in steady-state and transient conditions. Control rod movements are 
controlled with PARCS while flow rate is controlled by TRACE. The reactor instability 
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condition is induced by the low flow-high power condition. First, the pump is tripped after 
10 seconds and the natural pump coastdown begins and hence the flow rate drops. To 
increase the core power to large values, two control rod banks are withdrawn from the core 
70 seconds after the pump trip. After that, the core becomes unstable since the flow rate is 
low and the power is high which makes all thermal-hydraulic parameters (e.g. flow rate, 
power, temperature, pressure) oscillate. The results from the instability are calculated with 
using the RFRD at the bundle inlet and they are compared with the cases without using the 
RFRD. The accident scenario parameters used during TRACE simulation are listed in Table 
4.3.   
Table 4.3: TRACE accident scenario parameters 
Item value 
Pump trip Time (s) 10 
Control Rod Movement Time (s) 80 
Reverse flow Friction Coefficient (KFACR) 500 
Device axial position Axial node 1 
Time step (Min-Max) (s) 10
-6
- 0.1 
Initial relative power 75% 
 
4.3 Oskarshamn-2 TRACE Model for LOCA 
 
A TRACE model based on Oskarshamn-2 benchmark [4] has been developed in this 
study to investigate the effect of using RFRD to improve the safety of BWR during LOCA.  
The benchmark is based on transient measurements of the February 25, 1999 event at the 
Oskarshamn-2 Nuclear Power Plant. In this study Oskarshamn-2 model is used to simulate 
LOCA. The reason for selecting Oskarshamn-2 is that the core size is smaller than Ringhals-
1, the number of fuel bundles in Oskarshamn-2 reactor is 444 compared to the 648 bundles 
in Ringhals-1. In general, small cores are less complicated and less computationally 
30 
 
expensive while the improvement achieved by RFRD can still be observed. The core 
thermal-hydraulics and geometric data are given in Table 4.4, and the core vessel geometry 
is shown in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Sketch of Oskarshamn-2 vessel 
 
Table 4.4: Oskarshamn-2 vessel geometry and operating conditions 
Item Value 
Rated thermal power (MWth) 1700 
Dome pressure (MPa) 7.0 
Steam flow rate (kg/s) 900 
Rated recirc. Flow (kg/s) 7700 
 Internal height (m)  20 
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Table 4.4 (cont.) 
Weight (kg) 530,000 
Wall thickness (mm) 134 
Equivalent core diameter (mm) 3672 
Equivalent core height (mm) 3712 
Number of fuel bundles 444 
 
 The nodalization scheme of Oskarshamn-2 TRACE model is shown in Figure 4.4. The 
reactor model consists of the following components: 
1- Reactor vessel represented by VESSEL component.  
2- 444 fuel bundles represented by 222 BWR CHAN components in one-half core 
symmetry. 
3- One recirculation loop has an outtake pipe connected to the downcomer, through 
which the coolant is redirected to a recirculation pump. The coolant is pumped 
via the intake pipe to the lower plenum in the vessel.  
4- LOCA break is connected to the recirculation pipe that connected to the pump 
discharge. The break size is controlled by area fraction of a valve connected 
directly to the break  
5- Core spray and LPCI consist of a FILL and a PIPE component. 
6- Turbine system consists of a PIPE, a VALVE, and a BREAK to impose a pressure 
boundary condition. 
7- Feedwater system consists of a PIPE component and a FILL to impose a flow 
rate boundary condition.  
8- One steam separator represented by SEPD component. 
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Figure 4.4. Oskarshamn-2 TRACE model nodalization to simulate BWR LOCA. 
The reactor vessel is modeled by 3D vessel component with 15 axial cells, 2 radial cells, 
and 1 azimuthal sector. Each CHAN component is modeled with 28 uniform axial nodes. 
Both forward and reverse flow friction coefficients have been added to each channel 
component to model RFRD device. PARCS is supplemented with cross-section, geometry 
and coupling files. LBLOCA is selected as a base case to test the model, the results for this 
case including the pressure, power, break flow and other variables are reported in Appendix 
A. The results with and without the RFRD have been calculated using this TRACE/PARCS 
model.  
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The device effect for LOCA is determined through the Peak Clad Temperature (PCT) 
change calculated through:  
∆𝑇 = 𝑇𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐷                  (4.1) 
A positive ∆𝑇 means that the RFRD device is effective and PCT is reduced.  
4.2.1 LOCA Transients 
 
LOCA transient model includes all the changes in operation that occur after the break as 
appropriate systems have to be activated in order to mitigate adverse effects on the fuel. The 
LOCA is initiated by opening the BREAK component which is connected to the pipe in the 
recirculation loop through a valve. The initiation of LOCA is set at t = 15s. After 0.5s, control 
rod banks are inserted to shutdown the reactor and the pump is tripped. Three other events 
after that include the closure of the feedwater, closure of the turbine valve, and the activation 
of the emergency cooling systems at low pressures. Table 4.5 lists the main events following 
the LOCA break with the time for each event. 
Table 4.5: List of the main events of LOCA base model 
Event Time  
Break valve open time 15.0 s 
Pump trip 15.5 s 
CR bank insertion 15.5 s 
Closure of feedwater flow 16 s 
Closure of turbine valve 17 s 
ECCS Activation t @ P≤0.2 MPa 
 
The timing for activating and closing different systems during LOCA such as feedwater, 
turbine, and core spray systems should be described. For turbine valve, it is assumed that the 
turbine valve receives the signal in 0.2s followed by an additional 0.8s to start the procedure 
of closing the valve. 0.5s is needed after that to close the turbine valve itself. Closure of 
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feedwater is done in 1s where the feedwater flow is dropped from rated flow to zero. The 
activation of the emergency systems to cool the reactor fuel is determined by means of the 
pressure value in the core instead of time. When the pressure inside the core drops to a value 
of about 2 bar (0.2 MPa), core sprays and LPCI are activated. Timetables for the closure of 
turbine valve and feedwater, and the activation of ECCS are summarized in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Timetable for closure and activation of various systems during LOCA 
Event Time  Status 
Turbine valve closure 15.0 s 
16.0 s 
16.5 s 
Open  
Open  
Closed  
Feedwater closure 15.0 s 
16.0 s 
Open  
Closed  
ECCS activation 15.0 s 
t @ P≤0.2 MPa 
Closed  
Open  
 
The purpose of the main recirculation system is to provide the core with adequate coolant 
flow at all power levels. A single recirculation loop is used to provide the core flow (See 
Figure 4.4). The pump is able to provide the core with a 2.55 m3/sec flow rate at a 
temperature of 274 ºC, and elevate the water to 55 m height. The pump curves including 
pump head and relative hydrodynamic torque that are used in TRACE simulation are 
obtained from the validated model of Oskarshamn-2 [4].  
Choked or critical flow is occurring in cases where fluid moves from higher pressure 
volume at speed limited only by speed of sound for fluid. This situation occurs in LOCA as 
the break mass flow depends on the condition of the main system not on the pressure outside 
which is the containment pressure. TRACE is able to predict choked flow, and so in this 
thesis the choked flow model is activated with default TRACE parameters only at the 
BREAK component.    
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During normal operation the reactor is operating at full power and this value stays 
constant during steady-state calculations. In transient calculations, the power stays constant 
for the first 15s, but when the break occurs, the reactor scrams and the power decreases 
abruptly as it will decrease by 90% in about 2s. In this thesis, because the power changes in 
LOCA are not as critical as in BWR instability, PARCS is not used for power calculations. 
Instead, a power profile describes how the power is changing with time after scram should 
be provided for TRACE to do the transient calculations. Table 4.7 shows the time behavior 
of the decay power after scram based on modified ANS standards which is reported in this 
thesis [21]. It is clear from Table 4.7 that most of the core power is disappeared in 2s after 
scram, and the remaining heat source inside the core comes from the decay of the fission 
products.  
Table 4.7: Decay power variation after shutdown [21] 
Time (sec) Fraction Power (MW) 
15 1 1.705E+09 
15.1 0.525 8.951E+08 
16 0.134 2.285E+08 
17 0.103 1.756E+08 
19 0.077 1.313E+08 
21 0.074 1.262E+08 
23 0.07 1.194E+08 
25 0.068 1.159E+08 
35 0.061 1.040E+08 
55 0.0526 8.968E+07 
75 0.0485 8.269E+07 
95 0.046 7.843E+07 
115 0.044 7.502E+07 
215 0.0366 6.240E+07 
415 0.0315 5.37E+07 
615 0.0284 4.84E+07 
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4.2.2 Break Size 
 
The critical factor that determines LOCA scenario and severity is the break size. In 
general, as the break size increases, more coolant leaks, and the core uncovers more rapidly 
resulting in a higher clad temperature. The terminology that will be used in this study is 
listed in Table 4.8, as four categories will be used to specify the LOCA size based on the 
break area as a percentage of the recirculation loop flow area. For, example, 50% LOCA 
means that the break area is 50% of the recirculation loop flow area. Double-ended guillotine 
break (also known as 200% LOCA) is a hypothetical accident that occurs when the 
recirculation loop pipe attached to the pressure vessel is totally broken into two separate flow 
paths.    
Table 4.8: Classification of LOCA based on the break size 
Type Break area 
(% of flow area) 
Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) 1%-30% 
Intermediate Break LOCA (IBLOCA) 30%-60% 
Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) 60%-100% 
Double-Ended Guillotine (DEG) 200% 
 
 
4.4 Simulation Procedures  
 
For BWR instability scenarios, the TRACE/PARCS simulation consists of three 
different simulation steps connected through restart files as follows:  
1. Steady-state standalone TRACE thermal-hydraulics simulation for user-defined flow 
and power conditions. 
2. Coupled TRACE/PARCS steady-state calculations to initialize neutronics and 
thermal-hydraulics conditions for transient calculations. 
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3. Coupled TRACE/PARCS transient calculations using a pump trip as initiating event 
and control rod movements to induce instability. 
For LOCA scenarios, PARCS is deactivated since the power profile is provided to 
TRACE and so the simulation consists of two steps connected through a restart file as 
follows: 
1. Steady-state TRACE thermal-hydraulics simulation for user-defined flow and power 
conditions. 
2. Transient TRACE calculations using pipe break as initiating event. 
Steady-state results are used as initial conditions for the transient calculations. It is worth 
to mention that all of the simulation steps are important for accurate simulation, and this is 
one of the reasons that makes TRACE/PARCS calculations to be time- consuming.  
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION     
 
This Chapter is divided into two main sections: the first one presents the results that show 
the effect of the RFRD device on BWR instability accident while the second one 
demonstrates RFRD effect on LOCA. For BWR instability accident, three different cases 
have been analyzed to demonstrate the effectiveness of using RFRD on the unstable behavior 
of BWRs: 
1- The original Ringhals-1 model where RFRD is not applied at any bundle inlet. This 
case is designated as “No RFRD”.  
2- RFRD is implemented in a single channel (two fuel bundles) where flow rate 
reversal occurs. This case is designated as “RFRD in a single channel”. 
3- RFRD is implemented in all core channels. This case is designated as “RFRD in all 
channels”. 
The above three cases have been used to study the effect of RFRD on local parameters 
that are related to a single fuel bundle, namely bundle flow rate and PCT, and global 
parameters like core flow rate, power, and pressure. 
 For LOCA accident, three different LOCA scenarios with different break size have 
been simulated, namely, (1) 25% SBLOCA (2) 100% LBLOCA (Base Case) (3) 200% 
Double Ended Guillotine. The bundle flow rate and PCT are mainly studied for LOCA 
scenarios and the temperature reduction achieved when using the RFRD device is also 
demonstrated and compared for the three scenarios. Friction factor sensitivity on flow rate 
is also investigated to determine the value that would be adequate to prevent the reverse flow 
for both BWR instability and LOCA accidents. 
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5.1 BWR Instability Accident  
 
Ringhals-1 TRACE model is used to test the proposed device as RFRD is used in one 
channel (two fuel bundles) during BWR instability to investigate its effect on the bundle 
flow rate. Although knowing the fuel channel with flow reversal before the accident is not 
possible experimentally, this can be done in simulation. Therefore, a channel with flow 
reversal is selected to study the effect of RFRD on local parameters such as flow rate and 
PCT. Simulation results demonstrate that without restricting the flow in the downward 
direction, inlet mass flow rate in the fuel channel oscillates about its average value and it 
oscillates from positive values to negative values as shown in Figure 5.1. When the flow 
reversal occurs, the device drops down to block the holes beneath it and the flow is prevented 
in the reverse direction. Only insignificant flow rate reversal is allowed and the oscillation 
magnitude is thus limited. Moreover, a phase shift occurs in the oscillation waves after the 
addition of the device and the frequency increases by negligible amount (see Figure 5.1).    
 
Figure 5.1. Inlet flow rate oscillation in the fuel bundle with and without using the RFRD 
 
Since determining the bundles with flow reversal is not possible before the accident, the 
RFRD device should be implemented in all fuel bundles as in this case the simulation will 
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be more realistic. Consequently, the simulation is repeated with the RFRD in all channels to 
investigate the cumulative effect of the device. Figure 5.2 demonstrates that if RFRD is used 
in all bundles, small improvement of bundle flow oscillations can be achieved compared to 
the single channel results (See Figure 5.1). Flow rate oscillations start growing after 120s 
where the oscillation magnitude further decreases, and the frequency increases slightly.   
 
Figure 5.2. Inlet flow rate oscillations in a single bundle with flow reversal behavior 
 
Large power oscillations and reduced flow rate can cause excessive clad temperature 
which could lead to sustained clad dryout and hence fuel damage. Therefore, the clad 
temperature of the fuel should not exceed the safety limit during the core instability event. 
Since the flow reversal in a single channel has been mitigated by the RFRD device, the clad 
temperature should be reduced. Figure 5.3 shows that PCT increases sharply due to dryout 
41 
 
for the case without RFRD. However, the reduction in the PCT is significant either when 
RFRD is applied in one or all fuel bundles.  
 
Figure 5.3. PCT in a single hot bundle with flow reversal behavior  
 
According to U.S.NRC regulations, cladding temperature has to be less than about 2200 
ºF (~1480 K) in order to reuse fuel rods without any restriction, and the RFRD device ensures 
the PCT is well below that limit. To obtain lower clad temperatures, the cumulative effect 
of using the RFRD device in all fuel bundles can reduce the PCT to even level lowers than 
those achieved in a single bundle RFRD, even though single bundle RFRD resulted in 
adequate temperature. In other words, dryout-rewet cycle that could happen in this type of 
accidents could be eliminated with this hardware device. 
Similar to flow rate and clad temperature, power oscillation magnitude has been also 
affected by the RFRD device. Figure 5.4 shows the plot of the core power versus time with 
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and without using the RFRD. Without the RFRD device, core power oscillates between 20% 
and 230%. If the device is applied to only one channel, it has a very small effect on reducing 
the core power oscillations. This is due to the fact that the effect of a single channel on a 
global parameter like power is small. However, the effect of RFRD is significant if the device 
is used in multiple channels. Figure 5.4 demonstrates that if RFRD is used in all fuel bundles, 
it will reduce the power oscillation amplitude by about 50%. However, it should be noted 
that the reduction in power oscillation amplitude is rather modest, and so, the oscillatory 
dryout behavior is more sensitive to flow than power oscillation.  
 
Figure 5.4. Core power oscillations after using RFRD in one channel and all fuel channels 
 
It is important to mention that the simulation with RFRD device on all bundles has been 
done for two reasons. First, to demonstrate the best possible result from the device to 
guarantee the presence of liquid coolant in all bundles and ensure fast rewetting of the fuel 
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cladding surface. Thus, the cladding temperature remains below the safety limit and fuel 
damage is avoided when the RFRD is used. Second, the device should be used in all fuel 
bundles in practice since the bundles with flow reversal could not be known before the 
accident.  
The effect of using the RFRD in a single bundle and in all core bundles has been 
investigated to find its effect on the core flow rate and PCT. As only a limited number of 
bundles have a flow reversal behavior in the considered scenario, total core flow rate is 
always positive (oscillates approximately between 2350 kg/s and 2800 kg/s) as shown in 
Figure 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.5. Core flow rate with and without RFRD in all fuel channels 
As expected the effect of the RFRD in a single bundle on the core flow rate is small. On 
the other hand, it is clear that the core flow rate oscillation amplitude is decreased when 
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using the RFRD device in all fuel bundles. Therefore, RFRD reduces the flow rate oscillation 
magnitude locally in a single channel as well as globally in the core. In addition, it is worth 
to mention that the coupling effect between the power and flow rate can be observed here as 
the application of the device reduced the core power oscillation amplitude (see Figure 5.4), 
and due to the coupling, the flow rate oscillation amplitude should be reduced also. 
As the device proved to be effective to reduce the oscillations in flow, power, and PCT, 
other variables have been investigated to determine if the device can mitigate other thermal-
hydraulics oscillations (see Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7).  
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 5.6. (a) Feedwater flow oscillations (b) Steam flow oscillations 
 
Since the effect of a single bundle on global parameters is generally small, the results are 
presented when the device is applied in all fuel bundles. It seems that the device can mitigate 
the oscillations in other parameters like steam and feedwater flow rate by reducing the 
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oscillation amplitude by about 30%. In addition to that, the core pressure and water level 
oscillations can be reduced further even though the oscillation amplitude is already small 
even for the case without RFRD device (e.g. pressure oscillates from 7.03-7.07 MPa). 
However, in general the RFRD device can even reduce the oscillations amplitude in these 
variables and hence bring some improvements in the safety of the plant during this type of 
accidents.   
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 5.7. (a) Water Level oscillations (b) Core pressure oscillations 
 
As the study is based on the value of the reverse flow friction coefficient (KFACR) that 
the device can achieve at the channel inlet, a sensitivity study for the value of this parameter 
is investigated. Figure 5.8 shows the plot of the bundle flow rate for increasing values of 
KFACR. When KFACR is 0, this indicates that there is no device at all and it refers to the 
original case. The oscillation magnitude starts to decrease as KFACR increases, and the flow 
reduction increases as KFACR becomes bigger. A Significant reduction can be seen when 
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KFACR increases from 0 to 10 compared to the one when KFACR increases from 500 to 
1E+4. KFACR value of 500.0 is sufficient to achieve a restricted flow for instability 
accident, with taking into account that some leakage would still be possible.  
 
Figure 5.8. Flow rate oscillations for different values of KFACR during BWR instability 
 
 
5.2 LOCA Accident 
100% LBLOCA (Base Case)  
 Simulation results for Oskarshamn-2 100% LOCA model shows that the RFRD device 
can successfully prevent reverse flow that leads to coolant leakage from the fuel bundle inlet 
during LBLOCA. The results of 100% LOCA without RFRD including the pressure, power, 
break flow and other important variables are reported in Appendix A. As mentioned before, 
the RFRD is applied to all core bundles for LOCA case. Figure 5.9 shows that the flow rate 
behavior for a hot channel and an average channel during LBLOCA is nearly the same. 
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Negative flow rate occurs directly after the break as it reaches about -10 kg/s in hot bundle 
and -5 kg/s in average bundle due to the blowdown phase of LOCA as the coolant leaks from 
the break and from the bundle inlet out to the containment. After that the bundle is left dry 
with only steam flow for some time until the activation of the core sprays and LPCI. The 
reverse flow occurs again when the emergency water starts to flow inside the core. However, 
the RFRD device prevents flow reversal when it is applied to all bundles except at the 
beginning of the blowdown phase where insignificant flow reversal is still observed (see 
Figure 5.9).  
 
(a)                                                                     (b) 
Figure 5.9. Bundle flow rate during LBLOCA for (a) hot bundle (b) normal bundle 
 
The reverse flow has been eliminated after using RDRD for both stages during 
blowdown and after the activation of safety systems. Therefore, it is clear that the 
effectiveness of the device depends on how much flow reversal happens during the LOCA 
accident (See Figure 5.9). Therefore, by preventing the leakage by reverse flow, more 
coolant will stay within the core during blowdown and from the emergency systems which 
will help to cool the fuel. 
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The success of the RFRD device is measured by its effect on the PCT as additional 
coolant is preserved inside the core.  Figure 5.10 shows that PCT without using RFRD 
reaches a value of 1100 K and could lead to fuel damage as it is close to U.S.NRC limit of 
2200 ºF (~1480 K). On the other hand, RFRD can reduce the PCT of hot and average bundles 
to safer levels by increasing the amount of available coolant (see Figure 5.10). The device 
has another great advantage as we can see the fuel reaches the reflood period faster when 
using the RFRD device as the fuel quenches in shorter time than without using the RFRD. 
This is because as the cladding quenches, the surface becomes wetted, and saturation 
temperature of the clad decreases rapidly. The RFRD effect on LOCA is: 
1- Before the break, the device is already in the up position, no effect is observed 
(ΔT=0). 
2- Directly after the break, the ΔT (difference in PCT between LOCA with and without 
RFRD) increases sharply since the coolant inventory decreases rapidly (blowdown) 
without RFRD. 
3-  After that, ΔT starts to decrease until the activation of the safety systems when 
RFRD can keep more water inside the core and hence ΔT rises again.  
4- RFRD results in earlier quenching for the clad. In this case, ΔT reaches its maximum 
value since the PCT without RFRD is still high. 
The temperature difference between the two cases demonstrates that the device is 
capable of achieving a reduction up to 600 K for hot channel and up to 250 K for average 
channel during LBLOCA. 
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(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 5.10. PCT during 100% LBLOCA for (a) hot bundle (b) normal bundle 
 
On the other hand, RFRD has negligible effect on other quantities inside the core like 
the core pressure and the break flow. Figure 5.11 shows that the core pressure behavior is 
similar with and without using the RFRD device and this means that the device will not 
affect the core depressurization and hence the safety systems are activated at the same time. 
Similarly, the break flow is practically unchanged when using the RFRD since the break is 
in the recirculation loop and the device has no effect on the flow through the break. 
25% SBLOCA 
 
 A SBLOCA with break size of 25% is analyzed here. The results including the flow rate 
of the bundle as well as the PCT are shown in Figure 5.12. The flow rate of the bundle for 
small break is quite different from that of large break. The coolant blowdown is slower and 
the reverse flow is not as large as in the large break. However, the RFRD device benefit can 
be seen when the emergency systems are activated and the reverse flow would occur at that 
time due to the leakage of the ECCS water from the bundle inlet. Therefore, thanks to RFRD 
device as the cladding quenching occurs earlier and the PCT is decreased (See Figure 5.12). 
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(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 5.11. (a) Core pressure and (b) Break flow rate during 100% LBLOCA 
 
The PCT trend begins by temperature reduction to low temperature of 400 K after the 
break followed by gradual increase to the maximum value of about 950K. After that the 
cladding quenching occurs after activation of the core spray. The figure shows that the device 
has negligible effect on PCT for the first 400s as the ΔT (difference in PCT between LOCA 
with and without RFRD) is approximately zero during this period. 
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 5.12. 25% SBLOCA (a) bundle flow rate and (b) bundle PCT 
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However, when the spray water starts to refill the core, the maximum PCT is reduced to 
900 K by the RFRD device and the ΔT increases sharply to 500 K. After that, the cladding 
quenches and the saturation temperature is restored. Therefore, the effect of the RFRD 
device in SBLOCA is limited to the reflood phase of the transient as quenching begins in 
about 50s earlier when using the RFRD.  
Double Ended Break 
 
 The scenario for double ended break that has been simulated is 200% double ended 
guillotine break. The double ended break for BWRs occurs when a guillotine break occurs 
in the recirculation loop pipe that is attached to the pressure vessel so that the pipe is broken 
into two separate flow paths. Figure 5.13 shows the flow rate as well as PCT during the 
transient. The 200% LOCA is characterized by fast depressurization and large blowdown of 
flow rate to levels even higher than LBLOCA as flow rate drops to -35 kg/s directly after 
the break. This is because cutting the recirculation pipe into two flow paths will increase the 
leakage of coolant to large values compared to the other LOCA breaks, and this makes 
double ended guillotine break to be the most severe type of LOCA. For PCT, it seems that 
RFRD is not effective for the first 50s as the PCT with RFRD becomes slightly higher than 
without RFRD. This result means that the RFRD device would increase the PCT during the 
double ended break and this is undesirable effect. However, it is clear that the negative ΔT 
(difference in PCT between LOCA with and without RFRD) values are considered small 
and span for short time after the break. After that, the RFRD device reduced the temperature 
as ΔT starts to grow from negative values to large positive values. RFRD device can achieve 
a positive ΔT up to 550 K during the double-ended break LOCA. Similar to SBLOCA and 
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LBLOCA cases, the cladding saturation temperature is restored faster than the case without 
using the RFRD device (see Figure 5.13).   
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 5.13. 200% double-ended guillotine (a) bundle flow rate and (b) bundle PCT 
 
Therefore, based on the previous analysis, the effectiveness of the RFRD device is seen 
in three areas:  
1- The RFRD device can achieve a significant reduction in PCT for all three cases: 
LBLOCA, SBLOCA, and double-ended guillotine break.  
2- The RFRD device can achieve a faster quenching of the cladding for all three cases: 
LBLOCA, SBLOCA, and double-ended guillotine break.  
3- Duration of effectiveness is different for the three cases. For instance, RFRD is active 
for the whole period of LBLOCA. However, for SBLOCA RFRD is nearly inactive 
for the first 400s of the scenario. 
Friction Factor Sensitivity 
 
The value of the reverse flow friction coefficient (KFACR) that the device can provide 
during LOCA to ensure blocking the reverse flow is investigated. Since the blowdown phase 
53 
 
is the most critical moment as a large amount of water leaks from the core and carries 
significant momentum, the device should be able to prevent that leakage. Consequently, if 
the device is able to prevent the flow leakage during blowdown, it should be able to prevent 
any other smaller reverse flows. Figure 5.14 shows the plot of the bundle flow rate with 
increasing values of KFACR during LOCA. Increasing the value of KFACR from 0 to 500 
reduces the reverse flow but it seems to be inadequate, which means that the device should 
be able to sustain even larger pressure created when the water flows downward. The amount 
of coolant leakage decreases as KFACR increases, but the relative reduction becomes 
smaller as KFACR becomes bigger. For example, Figure 5.14 shows that a relatively small 
reduction is seen when increasing the KFACR from 5000 to 1E+4. Consequently, the value 
of 5000 for KFACR would be sufficient to achieve a well-restricted flow during LOCA. 
 
Figure 5.14. Bundle flow rate for different values of KFACR during LOCA 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this study, TRACE/PARCS code package has been used to study the effect of reverse 
flow restriction on mitigation of the power and flow rate oscillations to prevent the sustained 
fuel dryout and so increase the safety of BWRs. The presented results clearly demonstrate 
the potential of the previously described hardware device [1] to prevent core flow reversal 
and fuel dryout during a BWR instability event allowed to progress without scram. 
According to the post-dryout modeling in TRACE, the RFRD device prevents the failure in 
rewetting of the clad by reducing the time under dryout which reduces the PCT and maintains 
it within safe limits. The results also demonstrated that the device is suitable for core-wide 
mode instability events when RFRD is implemented in multiple fuel channels which reduces 
core power oscillations amplitude. For bundles that oscillate only in forward flow direction 
(i.e. no flow reversal), the device did not affect the flow rate oscillations of these bundles 
directly, but flow oscillation reduction was observed due to the neutronics coupling. This 
device will ensure presence of sufficient coolant to cause rewetting of the fuel cladding. The 
RFRD device demonstrates a great capability to keep the fuel safe during LOCA through 
two stages: 
1- Containing the coolant that leaves from the bundle inlet during the blowdown phase 
when massive amount of coolant leaves through the break at the beginning of LOCA. 
2- Containing the emergency cooling injection inside the core when the emergency 
systems are activated.    
 RFRD is capable to reduce the PCT to safer levels through maintaining additional 
coolant inside the core during LOCA. RFRD is also able to reduce the time needed to reach 
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the reflood phase and quenching when the saturation temperature of the clad is restored. The 
device demonstrates beneficial capabilities during large break and small breaks LOCA. 
Therefore, if the coolant leakage in LOCA accident is reduced by applying flow reversal 
restriction, there potentially can be a longer coping time during LOCA accidents and the 
cooling effectiveness of the ECCS will increase.  
However, the main limitation of RFRD is that it could not prevent the power and flow 
oscillations themselves from growing during BWR instability. It can only mitigate dryout-
rewet cycle that occurs due to power and flow rate oscillations in BWR instability scenarios, 
and reduce the clad temperature and restore the saturation temperature faster during LOCA 
accidents. RFRD could increase the PCT compared to the case without RFRD as in the case 
of double ended break even though that increase is small and spans only for short time. This 
issue needs more investigation to determine the factors that made the PCT to increase more 
in RFRD case. Furthermore, the problem of loose parts that might occur during the device 
operation puts another challenge for proper design of the device since these parts could block 
the flow or damage the cladding. 
As a future work, the minimum fraction of bundles in a fresh fuel reload that is needed 
to achieve universal core protection against instability clad temperature excursions will be 
investigated. Furthermore, the device can be investigated experimentally in facilities for 
LOCA and flow instability to validate the simulation results. Additional studies should be 
performed to see if RFRD can be useful for other types of accidents either in BWR or PWR 
and determine its capability to improve the safety of the reactor during these accidents.  
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APPENDIX A. Base LBLOCA (100%) Results  
 
 
Figure A.1. Core flow during LOCA 
         
Figure A.2. Core pressure during LOCA 
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Figure A.3. Core power during LOCA 
 
Figure A.4. Break Flow during LOCA 
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Figure A.5. Feedwater flow rate 
 
Figure A.6. Core spray flow rate (activated when the core pressure < 0.2 MPa) 
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